從法律經濟分析觀點論商標侵權反向混淆之正當性爭議：以博弈理論為中心

The Economic Analysis of the Reverse Confusion Debate in Trademark Infringement: Based on the Game Theory

不同於傳統正向混淆中小企業攀附大企業商譽的商標仿冒侵權行為，2012 年著名的蘋果電腦公司在中國大陸的iPad 商標糾紛，則是大企業利用小企業之註冊商標以促銷自己產品的反向混淆類型。透過案例法的肯認，反向混淆亦屬商標侵權類型之認知已獲共識。惟作為商業活動的手段，商標使用的主要目的在追求利益的最大化，無法或無意願將商標價值最大化的商標權人，在註冊主義的保護下，雖然維護了對其財產的自主權，卻衍生有限的社會資源無法做有效率分配的質疑，反向混淆保護的正當性面臨經濟效益觀點的挑戰。挑戰反向混淆理論「讓強勢侵權者繼續使用系爭商標，將對弱勢商標權人權益造成莫大損害」之傳統認知，本文嘗試透過博奕理論的若干理念及法律評價的典範轉移現象，推導出在反向混淆案件，讓弱勢商標權人個人財富最大化的作法，正是容忍強勢侵權者繼續使用系爭商標，並進一步提出、評析落實此政策的相關建議，最後再檢討我商標法制應如何因應。

Recognized as a specialized form of trademark protection, reverse confusion prevents the larger junior user from taking the smaller senior user's trademark as his own. However, it was also criticized that it protects the smaller senior user at the price of the waste of social resources because only the junior user of reverse confusion cases is capable of promoting trademark values through sheer economic strength. Hence, some scholars, from the perspective of economical efficiency, suggest that where the benefits exceed the harms, the best solution is to allow the junior user's infringement despite the harm to the senior user.