新傾向論與內在遮蓋者難題

New Dispositionalism and Intrinsic Fink Problems

史密斯（2003）建議，我們可以用傾向來理解其他可能性，並以此解消法蘭克福（1969）對其他可能性原則提出的挑戰，文獻上稱此進路為新傾向論。根據史密斯，在法蘭克福的案例中，行動者的其他可能性只是被干預者遮蓋，而不是被干預者消除。而這就顯示出，行動者仍舊保有其他可能性，法蘭克福的案例並不是其他可能性原則的反例。科恩與韓福德（2007）反對史密斯的論點，他們指出，在不承認內在遮蓋者的情況下，史密斯的新傾向論將無法解消某些法蘭克福式案例，對其他可能性原則的辯護並不全面，所以並不令人滿意。在這篇文章中，筆者將論證，科恩與韓福德對史密斯的批評並不完全成立，因為他們的批評預設了有爭議的傾向的條件句分析理論。

Smith (2003) proposes a dispositional account of alternative possibilities, called New Dispositionalism, to resist Frankfurt's claim that moral responsibility does not require alternative possibilities (or the ability to do otherwise). He argues that, in Frankfurt's case (1969), the agent's alternative possibility is masked by the intervener, but it is nevertheless a present alternative possibility. Frankfurt's case, hence, is not a genuine counterexample to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities at all. However, according to Cohen and Handfield (2007), Smith's account is shown to be untenable for the reason that it does not work for all Frankfurt-type examples unless it is implausibly committed to intrinsic finks. In this paper, I argue that Cohen and Handfield's criticism is not conclusive since it presupposes the debatable conditional analysis of dispositions.