抽象與具體事物的區分

Concrete Objects Distinction

大多數當代哲學家認為，這個世界裡的事物可以被互相排斥而又共同窮舉地區分成兩個類：一類是具體的事物類，另一類則是抽象的事物類。問題在於：這兩類事物之間的區別究竟何在？Hoffman與Rosenkrantz（2003）曾經論證說，常見的、對於抽象／具體事物的區分方式存在著一些明顯的問題，而他們主張以一種新穎的、在他們看來沒有問題的方式去作出這兩類事物之間的區別。本論文旨在以他們批評其它區分時所使用的策略與標準而去反對他們所提出的區分，並從而論證兩個要點。首先，本文論證說，抽象／具體事物之所以不容易（甚至不可能）找到一個可信的區分方式，原因相當可能在於：我們對該區分所擁有的任何直覺都是許多不等價與／或混合的區分互相混淆的結果。其次，本文論證說，抽象／具體事物的區分本身其實不具有任何哲學上的重要性，因而是一個可以不必深究的問題。

Most contemporary philosophers believe that things in the world can be exhaustively and exclusively divided into two categories: abstract objects and concrete ones, and a main ”problem” about this division is where exactly the line between these two categories should be drawn? Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (2003) argued that every ordinary distinction between these two categories was subject to some serious problems and counterexamples, and they therefore proposed a novel distinction that they believed to be completely unproblematic. This paper argues against their proposal by appealing to the same strategy and criterion that they set up for other proposals. This paper also argues for two other points. First, it argues that the fundamental reason why it is so hard (even impossible) to find ”the right” distinction between abstract and concrete objects is that philosophers' ”intuition” about the distinction is nothing but the result of conflation and confusion of several non-equivalent and/or vague distinctions. Second, it argues that the problem of the distinction between abstract and concrete objects is of no philosophical significance; it is, therefore, a pseudo problem that need not be investigated at all.