共感與超感性者：鑑賞判斷的規範性

Sensus Communis and the Supersensible: The Normativity of the Judgment of Taste

本文反對將鑑賞判斷的規範性建立在道德上。主要的進路是：藉由鑑賞判斷的模態環節的特殊地位與功能來闡明審美規範性的獨特性，即鑑賞判斷的規範性內容構成判斷本身的內容；藉由明辨「構成性的」／「規約性的」的這個區分在兩個不同的脈絡之運用──即不僅用來區分知性法則和理性原則，同時也用來區分數學性法則和力學性法則──，以便嚴格區分兩種不同的共感：純粹的和理想的共感。「純粹的共感」是構想力與知性的自由遊戲的結果，它既是一種情感，也是一種感受能力（鑑賞力），而且又是判斷的構成性規範與原則。「理想的共感」則是「純粹的共感」與道德情感的先天連結，它是構想力、知性與理性協調一致的結果。就規範性效力而言，純粹的共感類比於知性的力學性法則（例如，自然因果律）；但理想的共感對於鑑賞判斷卻只是規約性的，就如理性原則對於經驗判斷一樣。美能夠象徵道德，正是因為美感本身是純粹的，不是反過來；否則的話，鑑賞力的自律將遭受侵犯。「理想的共感」可以用來引導鑑賞力合目的性地自我銳利與純化，以便藉此提高人性，使得一個合乎道德理想的人文世界的建立「實用地」變得可能。本文最後，診斷康德為什麼「彷彿」將美建立在道德上的理由，其實就在於他的批判的自然目的論的「實用意義」中。

This paper argues against grounding the normativity of the judgment of taste on morality, and argues that the uniqueness of aesthetic normativity can be clarified through the distinctive status and function of the modality of the judgment of taste, and that the normative content of the judgment of taste constitutes the content of the judgment itself. Two distinct notions of sensus communis-pure sensus communis and ideal sensus communis-are strictly discriminated by applying the constitutive/regulative distinction, which can be seen in the following two contexts: the distinction between law of understanding and principle of reason, and the distinction between mathematical law and dynamic law. 'Pure sensus communis' is the effect of the free play of imagination and understanding; it is not only a feeling, but also a capacity for feeling (taste) and a constitutive norm and principle of the judgment. 'Ideal sensus communis' is the a priori connection between pure sensus communis and moral feeling; it is the effect of the harmony among imagination, understanding and reason. With respect to the normative force, pure sensus communis is analogous to dynamic law of understanding (for example, the law of causality); nevertheless, ideal sensus communis is regulative for the judgment of taste, just as principle of reason is regulative for empirical judgment. Beauty can symbolize morality precisely because the pleasure of taste is pure, but not vice versa; otherwise the autonomy of taste would be violated. Taste can be guided in its purposive self-sharpening and self-purifying by ideal sensus communis to enhance humanity, so that it becomes ”pragmatically” possible to ground a world in concordance with moral ideal through the enhancement of humanity. In the end, this paper argues that the reason why Kant seems to ground beauty on morality lies in the pragmatic significance of his critical natural teleology.