使用非一般公認會計準則績效揭露達到分析師預期——通過法規G之後的證據

Using Non-GAAP Earnings Disclosures to Meet or Beat Analyst Forecasts: Evidence since the Passage of Regulation G

本研究調查S&P500大公司自2009年至2013年期間，公司使用非一般公認會計準則績效與達到分析師預期之間的關係，我們的實證研究顯示當公司持續自願性的揭露非一般公認會計準則績效時，較易達到分析師預期。我們檢視公司是否使用非一般公認會計準則績效與一般公認會計準則績效數字差異數字從事投機行為。實證結果顯示公司會使用差異數字進行盈餘平穩化。額外測試的結果也顯示公司會交替使用差異數字、應計數及實質盈餘管理，這些證據說明了美國證管會僅在監管公司過度使用非一般公認績效上，僅達到部份成效。

This paper investigates the relationship between meeting or beating analyst forecasts and the disclosure of non-GAAP reports using non-GAAP earnings disclosures from S&P 500 firms for the fiscal period from 2009–2013. According to the empirical results, firms that voluntarily and persistently disclose non-GAAP earnings are more likely to meet or beat the mean consensus forecasts of analysts. The difference between non-GAAP and GAAP earnings is used to examine whether firms disclose non-GAAP earnings opportunistically through non-GAAP exclusions. The results show that firms use discretion in employing non-GAAP exclusions to smooth income. Additional tests suggest a substitute association between non-GAAP exclusions and accruals management. The empirical results indicate that Securities and Exchange Commission oversight is only partially effective in limiting the misuse of non-GAAP reporting.