終審法院員額之規範指引與最適規模──考量行為科學觀點的憲法分析

The Best Size for Taiwanese Supreme Court(s): A Constitutional Analysis Incorporates Behavioral Scientific Perspective

蔡英文總統2016年當選後召開「司改國是會議」，會議結論大幅刪減普通法院與行政法院系統的終審法院員額，並縮減為民、刑、行政各一庭，作為邁向「金字塔型」訴訟結構、統一法院見解的關鍵一步。立法者就司法組織之形塑固有寬泛的形成空間，惟合法性上仍受憲法之規範面拘束，亦應考量對司法運作與人民訴訟權的政策影響。美國法在此議題上不但有充分規範討論，更有獨特的、行為科學的實證研究成果，本文參酌後進行對終審法院員額刪減之分析，並提出政策建議，以平衡統一法院見解與保障人民訴訟權之需求。

Judicial reform is a major platform of President Tsai’s 2016 campaign. She established Judicial Reform Council after her election. The council concluded a significant downsize of Taiwanese Supreme Court(s) system (judges and chambers alike) to resolve conflicting decisions between chambers within the current Supreme Court(s). Such downsize should be limited by, first, constitutionality, and second, its policy implication on the judiciary as well as people’s right to legal remedy, although the Legislative Yuan (Parliament) enjoys a wide range of discretion in principle. To propose policy suggestion that balances people’s legal remedy right and the need of resolving conflicting legal decisions, this article makes reference to American experience for its abundant normative analysis as well as behavioral research.