工具性與無關緊要性：蒯因論指稱和實體化

Instrumentality and Indifference: Quine's Ideas on “Reference” and “Reification”

蒯因前期所提出的存有學允諾標準，告訴我們一個理論到底允諾了什麽東西存在，但緊接著，蒯因又說到這些被允諾的東西無關緊要。表面上來看，蒯因似乎說了一些模棱兩可的話，而這造成了當代學界某種對於蒯因存有學的誤解：一方面，學者們誤以為蒯因把存有學問題視作語言學問題；另一方面，他們認定蒯因的存有學立場是不一致的。本文將透過釐清「指稱」、「對象」與「實體化」這三個蒯因存有學中的重要概念來澄清蒯因的存有學立場，並進一步論證，本文對蒯因存有學的分析與解讀可以匡正誤解，從而辯護蒯因存有學立場的一致性。

Quine's previous criterion of ontological commitment tells us what a theory commits to exist, but then Quine says that these committed things are unimportant. On the surface, Quine seems to have made some ambiguous remarks, which has led to some misunderstanding of Quine's ontology in contemporary academia. On the one hand, scholars mistakenly believe that Quine regards ontology as a linguistic problem; on the other hand, they hold that Quine's ontological standpoint is inconsistent. This article will clarify Quine's ontological standpoint by clarifying three important concepts: “reference,” “object” and “reification,” and further prove that the analysis and interpretation of Quine's ontology in this article can correct misunderstandings and defend the consistency of Quine's ontological standpoint.