工會議價能力與企業社會責任

Bargaining Power and Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility

本研究利用存在工會的寡占市場模型，探討市場進入下對於在位者企業社會責任策略之選擇，以及其對社會福利分配的影響。結果發現：若允許產業結構由獨佔市場下，允許新的進入者加入。當工會具有完全議價能力時，在位者採行消費者導向之策略性社會責任，將不利於自身的利潤水準。因此，在位者並沒有動機去執行企業的社會責任。反之，當工會完全不具有議價能力時，採行消費者導向之策略性社會責任，將有助於企業的利潤水準上升。

This study uses the oligopolistic market with unions to explore the choice of social responsibility strategies for incumbents and their impact on social welfare distribution. It turns out that if the industrial structure is allowed to be monopolized by the market, new entrants are allowed to join. When the union has full bargaining power, the incumbent adopts consumer-oriented strategic social responsibility, which will not be conducive to its own profit level. Therefore, the incumbent does not have the motivation to implement the corporate social responsibility. Conversely, when the union does not have bargaining power at all, adopting consumer-oriented strategic social responsibility will help the firm's profit level rise.