從危險故意理論省思放火故意之實質內涵──以最高法院105年度台上字第2179號判決及其歷審判決爭點為出發點

Rethinking the Content of Intention of Arson on the Basis of the Theory of the Intention to Endanger from No. 2179 Judgement of the Supreme Court in 2016 and Its Previous Decisions

即使是在現代風險社會中，刑法仍應遵循其自由主義式的刑法傳統，優先尊重個體之主體性與自由，並接受個人面對風險時自我判斷之空間，只有當行為人對其行為將導致法益侵害之支配具備明確的認知與意欲時，始能處以故意刑罰。因此所謂的危險故意，僅能是對於造成法益具體危險的知與欲。在此種危險故意理論的基礎上，放火罪作為對生命、身體法益前置性保護的抽象危險犯，其主觀故意仍必須是對生命、身體法益的具體危險故意，如此立法者對放火罪所配置之高度法定刑才得以具有正當性。本文檢討之實務判決不僅因為將放火故意簡化詮釋為放火風險認知而有缺失，更因為直接以放火故意之證明同時認定了殺人故意，而有混淆放火故意與殺人故意之疑慮。

In the risk society should criminal law always be a liberal criminal law, which respects the subjectivity and freedom of the individual and allows the individual the space, even in the risk situation, the decisions to take action. Only the perpetrator who acts with the sure awareness and will to rule the violation of the legal asset, is punished as intentional. Based on this, the so-called endangering intention can be such an intention, which presupposes knowledge and willingness to take concrete risks. Likewise, the intention to arson is legitimate if it is an intention to concrete endangerment of the life and body of an individual. The definition of the purpose of the intention to arson, which has been established by case-law, is therefore misleading.