英文摘要 |
The Taiwan government aggressively encourages foreign firms to be listed in Taiwan, but these firms' equity structure and sophisticated transaction arrangements are too complicated for the average investor to fully understand. Thus, the firm's information transparency and shareholders' rights protection are often questioned. The mechanisms of corporate governance and dividend policy are meant to mitigate agency problems, however, prior literature has found different evidence on the complementary or substitute roles between the two. Given that severe information asymmetry is a special characteristic of foreign firms listed in Taiwan, this study uses corporate governance ratings data published by the Securities & Futures Institute for years 2016-2017 to investigate whether the relationship between corporate governance and dividend policy is different from that of domestic firms listed in Taiwan. The results show that, for foreign firms listed in Taiwan, better corporate governance results in lower cash dividend payout, which means a substitution effect exists between corporate governance and dividend payout when information asymmetry is severe. In addition, considering that corporate governance and dividend payout are even more important for firms having severe agency problems, this study has further detected and verified that when free cash flow is high, corporate governance and dividend payout are negatively correlated for foreign firms listed in Taiwan. |