英文摘要 |
The paper argues that the problem of “identification” of “personal data” is actually an “epistemological” inquiry, because it is involved with three elements: the identifying subject, the process and means of identification, and the object. Failure to account for any of the elements would render the solution of “identification” problem incomplete. The legal definition of “personal data” shall include descriptions with respect to “the identifying subject” and “the means of identification”. In the EU, legal academics provide two approaches -- “absolute theory” and “relative theory”. The opinion of EU Court, Article 29 Working Party, and UK Information Commissioner’s Office all adopt the relative approach. Same to the problem of “identification”, the “anonymisation” of personal data is also concerned with three elements: the re-identifying subject, the means of identification, and the object. The recital of Directive and GDPR both consider the re-identifying subject to be “the controller and any other persons”, while the UK proposes the test of “motivated intruder”. Regarding the means of identification, the EU refers to the means “likely reasonably” to be used for identification. Article 29 Working Party requested the anonymisation to be “irreversible”. The term “irreversible” should be understood as not reversible by the means “likely reasonably” to be used, which is essentially the relative approach. |