| 中文摘要 |
我國金融機構──尤以金融控股公司為代表──多數係集中型股權結構，存在控制股東挪用金融機構資金服務自身利益的利益衝突可能，已成為金管會近年關切的議題。傳統公司治理理論往往仰賴獨立董事監督控制股東之利益輸送，但獨立董事之獨立性在我國向來飽受質疑，蓋控制股東挾其優勢股權，往往選任其友好人選出任獨立董事，進而影響董事會之獨立性。比較法上為緩解此顧慮，已發展出「提名委員會」模式，要求公司設置主要由獨立董事組成的提名委員會，負責推薦董事與獨立董事候選人；近年更發展出「少數股東特別選任權」模式，賦予少數股東特殊的董事選舉權、否決權或杯葛權，以促使董事對少數股東負責。本文分析上述模式之相對優劣後，提出改良版提名委員會之芻議，建議：一、強制我國金融機構設置提名委員會負責董事提名，以避免董事會自我提名之利益衝突；二、提名委員會應有相當席次由「持股一千股以上股東一人一票」選舉產生之「少數股東代表」擔任，以避免控制股東乃至有力股東把持此選舉程序，提升提名委員會之獨立性。本文並進一步提出相關配套措施，例如要求提名委員會公布董事候選人之推薦人、並對拒絕納入推薦名單的董事候選人負說明義務等，以期為我國金融機構的公司治理改革提出具體可行之芻議。
The ownership structure of financial institutions in Taiwan is mostly concentrated, which is likely to involve the conflict of interest under which controlling shareholders tunnel the fund of financial institutions to serve their own interest. This has become an issue of concern to the Financial Supervisory Commission of Taiwan. Although corporate governance reform can rely on independent directors to monitor the tunneling of controlling shareholders, the independence of independent directors is often questionable in Taiwan. This is because controlling shareholders, based on its dominant ownership, often appoint friendly faces to serve independent directors, which affects the independence of the board of directors. To alleviate this concern, comparative laws have developed the ＂nominating committee＂ model, which requires companies to establish a nominating committee composed of independent directors to take the charge of recommending director and independent director candidates. In recent years, some countries further developed the ＂special appointment right of minority shareholders＂ model, which accords minority shareholders special right to elect, veto, or boycott directorate candidates to hold directors accountable to minority shareholders. After analyzing the pros and cons of these two models, I propose a revised nominating committee in this paper, which suggests: First, financial institutions in Taiwan shall establish nominating committees to take the charge of director nomination so as to avoid the conflict of interest arisen from the board's self-nomination. Second, a sufficient number of seats on nominating committees shall be reserved to the ＂minority shareholder representatives＂ elected by the ＂one shareholder, holding a thousand shares or more, one vote＂ rule so as to prevent controlling shareholders or blockholders from capturing the election process and to enhance the independence of nominating committees. I further propose a number of supplementary measures in this article, such as requiring nominating committees to disclose the recommenders of each directorate candidates and to explain their reasons to directorate candidates who are excluded from the recommendation list, etc. It is anticipated that this article provides practical suggestions for the corporate governance reform of financial institutions in Taiwan. |
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