中國家族企業接班與政治關係對公司績效的影響

Family Firm Succession, Political Connection and Performance: Evidence from China

本研究以2007年至2012年在中國上海、深圳交易所上市的A股為樣本，探討中國家族企業於後代接班後對公司績效之影響。以Tobin's Q為企業績效衡量指標，實證結果發現家族企業由後代接班對其績效有負向影響。此外，本研究發現家族企業由後代接班者，若擁有政治關係則能維持較佳經營績效。若進一步將接班程度區分成完全接班或準接班，則不論接班狀態為何，政治關係都能對績效有正面影響。本研究也發現家族企業政治關係對績效之正面效果係來自於地方政府關係，在幅員廣大的中國，地區性的政治關係反而能為企業帶來實質助益。整體而言，本研究提供中國證據支持華人家族企業在後代接班後會有較差績效，而政治關係對於後代接班家族企業具有正向的中介影響。 This study investigates the effect of succession on family firm performance by using Chinese family firms listed as A-share on Shanghai and Shenzhen exchange from 2007 to 2012. We use Tobin's Q as our measure for corporate performance. The empirical results show that succession has a negative effect on family firm performance. In addition, we find that family firms succeeded by their heirs will have better performance if they own political connections relative to those without political connections. Dividing succession into stages of fully and quasi-succession, we find that political connection has a positive effect on family firm performance in both stages. Finally, we find that the positive relation between political connection and firm performance of family firms succeeded by their heirs comes mainly from family firms that own locally political connection. This is consistent with the fact that local connection is more useful in a huge country like China.