不作為因果判斷中的假設性思考問題

The Problems of Counterfactual Thinking in Omissive Causal Judgements

本文運用對比因果論，處理不作為因果判斷中假設性思考的三個問題：不作為如何成為原因項、原因過度滋生、因果篩選。本文主張：一、不作為宣稱是一種對比判斷；二、不作為因果判斷中的假設性思考受到規範限制，它是正常化情境的反事實思考；三、因果篩選涉及規範適用。最後，本文指出，不作為因果判斷的因果篩選，其目的是為了找出適當的干預對象，並提出一種基於成本考量的判準來補充訴諸規範的因果篩選。 This article deploys the contrastive theory of causation to deal with three problems of the hypothetical thinking in omissive casual judgements: omission as causal relata, the proliferation of causes, and causal selection. It argues: first, claims about omissions are contrastive judgements; second, the hypothetical thinking in omissive causal judgements is constrained by norms and is counterfactual reasoning in a normalized situation; third, causal selection involves the application of norms. Finally, the point of causal selection in omissive causal judgments is to pick out appropriate targets for interventions, and this article proposes a criterion based on the cheapest cost preventer to supplement the norm-based criteria for causal selection.