部董事薪酬合約與控制股東股份控制權與現金流量權偏離程度之關聯

Inside Director's Compensation Contract and Controlling Shareholders' Control-Cash Flow Right Deviation

本研究以台灣2002年至2004年的上市櫃公司為研究樣本，探討董事會是否透過內部董事薪酬合約設計，以解決控制股東因股份控制權與現金流量權偏離程度愈大而可能衍生控制股東與非控制股東間之代理問題。本研究從代理理論角度，認為當內部董事非控制股東時，二者利害關係可能不一致，但內部董事透過參與公司經營可能取得控制股東對公司影響力的私有資訊，此時若董事會能給予內部董事適當誘因，使其利害關係與公司未來績效而非與控制股東一致，則能發揮內部董事之私有資訊分享功能，提升董事會監督效能。實證結果顯示，當內部董事非控制股東時，其薪酬之私有資訊分享激勵效果會隨著控制股東的股份控制權與現金流量權偏離程度提升。然而當內部董事是控制股東時，前述關聯性並不顯著。本研究進一步發現，上述薪酬之私有資訊分享激勵效果主要來自內部董事的董事身份薪酬，而非其經理人身份薪酬。此實證結果支持董事會試圖透過內部董事薪酬合約設計，發揮其私有資訊分享功能，以解決控制股東股份控制權偏離現金流量權所帶來之潛在代理問題。 Using a sample of TWSE/TPEx-listed companies from 2002 to 2004, the study investigates whether the board of directors utilizes the compensation contract of inside directors to ameliorate the entrenchment of controlling shareholders whose control rights exceed cash flow rights. Based on agency theory, we predict that in case where inside directors are not controlling shareholders, a compensation contract could mitigate the entrenchment of controlling shareholders by providing incentives for inside directors to share the private information obtained by serving in executive positions. Our empirical results show that in case where inside directors are not controlling shareholders, incentives for inside directors' compensation for sharing private information is positively related to controlling shareholders' control right exceeding cash flow right; however, this relation is insignificant in cases where inside directors are controlling shareholders. Further evidence reveals that the above findings are driven by the director pay of inside directors, rather than executive pay. Overall, the study documents that the board of directors addresses the entrenchment of controlling shareholders through the use of compensation contract, which provides incentives for inside directors to share private information.