供應商囤貨行為及政權介入對於災後農產品供應鏈管理之影響

Post-Disaster Grain Supply Chain Management with Supplier Hoarding and Regime Intervention

This study proposes a research model to address the causal relationships among regimeintervention, supplier hoarding intention and its antecedents in a post-disaster grain supplychain. We argue that the regime intervention can moderate the relationship among supplierhoarding intention, supplier’s belief of future earnings, and supplier’s attitude towards riskreduction of disruption after a disaster. Using data acquired from questionnaires, this studyapplies structural equation modeling (SEM) to test the research model. Our findings showthat regime intervention mitigates the positive effect of supplier belief in future earningson supplier hoarding intention. Also, regime intervention increases the negative effect ofsupplier attitude towards risk reduction of disruption after a disaster on supplier hoardingintention. Finally, we discuss the findings and the practical implications for disruption ofthe grain supply chain. 本研究提出一個關於供應商囤貨行為意圖的假設模型，探討災後農產品供應商囤貨意圖及其成因與政權介入三者之間的關係。我們認為政權介入時，能有效調節災後的囤貨意圖，可從供應商預期未來收益以及供應商災後傾向風險趨避的態度這兩個面向來予以分析。使用結構方程模型（SEM）實證結果發現，政權介入確實會降低供應商對於未來預期收入增加的預期心理。另一方面，供應商在面臨災後生意中斷風險時的態度，則可經由政權介入提供正向的協助。最後一章節，我們將會深入討論這些實證結果的意涵，並提供農產品供應鏈管理實務上應用的建議與未來可能的研究方向。