從比較法觀點論操縱市場概括條款之主觀構成要件

Subjective Elements of the Market Manipulation Catch-all Provision from the Perspective of Comparative Methods

因證券交易法第155條第1項第7款「概括條款」對操縱市場之主觀要件隻字未提，構成要件抽象模糊已形成重大爭議。概括條款是否可適用於被告成立操縱市場罪責，個案被告之主觀意圖判斷成為關鍵要點。本文從效率市場假說及相關法經濟學論著之觀點，研究單以行為外觀而判斷行為人之動機，可能形成盲點並造成寒蟬效應。本文並參考美國及法國之相關實務判決，說明交易行為是否違法可能將完全取決於交易者有無竄改市場正常股價反映之意圖。在投資人利用操縱市場獲利之成功率極低的情形下，操縱市場之刑罰應非針對造成股價波動之正常投資行為，但應處罰出於操縱市場之惡意，即以虛偽不實之操縱手法影響市場之欺騙行為。操縱市場概括條款中另存在何謂「直接」或「間接」影響交易市場手段定義不明的抽象規範，造成政府機關及投資人皆需付出大量司法監督成本，建議應修法改善。 Due to the fact that the ＂Catch-all Provision＂ stipulated in Article 155, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 7 of the Securities Exchange Act completely fails to regulate the subjective elements of market manipulation, the abstraction and vagueness of these constitutive elements have become a major controversy. The defendant's subjective intentions are key points in judging whether the Catch-all Provision is applicable towards the constitution of the defendant's crime in market manipulation. From the perspectives of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) and relevant publications on law and economics, this research determines that the assessment of an individual's motives solely based on external behavior may result in the formation of blind spots and induce chilling effects. This research also references relevant practical judgments from the United States and France to explain that the illegality of transactions may completely depend on whether the trader had the motive to tamper with responses in regular market stock prices. In circumstances where investors who manipulate the market have low success rates in profit gains, market manipulation penalties should not be targeted at normal investment behaviors that cause stock price volatility, but should be used to punish malicious acts of market manipulation, meaning deceptive behaviors of using false operating methods to influence the market. The market manipulation ＂Catch-all Provision＂ furthermore contains abstract, ill-defined definitions of ＂direct＂ or ＂indirect＂ influences in market manipulation, and has incurred high judicial supervision costs borne by both government agencies and investors. For these reasons, the provision should be amended and rectified as soon as possible.