南海仲裁案中台灣的選擇：程序、實體與國家定位

The Choice of Taiwan in the South China Sea Arbitration: Issues in Relation to Statehood, Substantive and Procedural Matters

在菲律賓訴中國的南海仲裁案實體判斷中，臺灣被稱作「臺灣中國當局」，且太平島被認定為不具備海洋法公約第121條意義下的「島」，以致臺灣政府聲言無法接受該仲裁判斷。作為南海爭端中聲索方之一，且已占領管理太平島七十餘年，臺灣何竟在國際訴訟程序中走到這一步？本文從國家定位、實體與程序面，審視臺灣涉入南海仲裁爭點的環節，並主張即使臺灣參與國際司法程序有困難，在這三個面向向臺灣仍有一些選擇的空間，而仲裁判斷如何對待臺灣，是當事雙方與仲裁庭所採立場交互作用的結果。具體而言，本文認為：1）即使表面上稱臺灣為「中國當局」，實際上無論菲律賓或仲裁庭是把臺灣當成與中國不同的主體對待；2）雖然形式上臺灣是訴外的一方，但藉由其自己在太平島島嶼地位上的立場表達與資訊提供，且仲裁庭賦予該等資訊實質考慮，臺灣實質上參與了就太平島島嶼地位的仲裁程序，且其主張被仲裁庭充分考量；3）鑑於太平島所可能衍生的海域權利，與菲律賓之訴所在海域最有可能產生重疊，臺灣原本有機會以訴外方身份請求第三方參與，甚或主張其法律利益已構成「本案之實體」以致仲裁庭無管轄權。終究臺灣沒有選擇由程序上介入，反而選擇在實體上在太平島一點上實質參與，對臺灣與國際訴訟程序，以及與中國的關係，皆有值得省思的影響。 In the South China Sea Arbitration (The Philippines v China) Award (Merits), how come Taiwan - a claimant in the South China Sea dispute who has been occupied and managed the largest naturally-formed feature in the Spratlys -- Itu Aba -- for more than 70 years- was named ＂Taiwan Authority of China＂ and Itu Aba found not an ＂island＂ in the meaning of Article 121 of UNCLOS? Probing into such a happening, this paper reviews issues surrounding Taiwan’s involvement in the South China Sea Arbitration in relation to statehood, substantive as well as procedural matters. It is argued that, in any of these three aspects, Taiwan in fact retained certain room of maneuver, even though as an unrecognized state, it has difficulties in being accepted by other states as a counterpart in state-to-state interactions, including adjudicative proceedings. The treatments Taiwan received in each of the three aspects in the proceedings resulted from positions taken by both the litigants as well as the Tribunal. Specifically, this paper argues that 1) Although called an ＂Authority of China＂ in the Award, Taiwan has in fact been treated by the Philippines and by the Tribunal as a subject distinct from China; 2) Although formally a non-party to the proceedings, by the operation of its own submissions on the status of Itu Aba and the Tribunal’s consideration of its submissions, Taiwan in effect has participated in the proceedings; and 3) Being the occupant of Itu Aba, whose maritime entitlement presents real potentials for overlapping with areas covered by the Filipino submissions, Taiwan should have been in a position to file for permission for third-party intervention. The fact that Taiwan did not choose this avenue, but instead chose to engage with the Tribunal on Itu Aba substantively, is instructive for understanding the attitude of Taiwan - at least under the then incumbent Administration- toward international adjudication, as well as toward China.