繼任總經理類型、機構投資人類型與繼任初期之成本僵固性

CEO Successors, Institutional Investors, and Cost Stickiness in the Early Years of Succession

本研究旨在探討繼任總經理類型（即內部晉升或外部聘任）與繼任初期之成本僵固性的關聯性，並進一步考量前述關聯性在不同類型機構投資人（即主動機構投資人與被動機構投資人）與其持股率高低之間是否有所差異。採用2005年至2015年的台灣上市櫃公司為樣本，本研究的實證結果發現：相較未更換總經理，內部晉升與外部聘任總經理在繼任初期的成本僵固性較低。更重要地，相較於內部晉升總經理，外部聘任總經理在繼任初期較會減緩成本僵固性。此外，持股率高之主動機構投資人可降低外部聘任總經理及內部晉升總經理之成本僵固性，且持股率高之主動機構投資人對外部聘任總經理成本僵固性的減緩程度，顯著地大於內部晉升總經理。

This study investigates the association between the chief executive officer (CEO) successor origin (outsider/insider CEOs) and cost stickiness, and further examines whether the relationship between successor origin and cost stickiness is affected by the types of institutional investors (active/passive institutional investors) and levels of institutional ownership. Using a sample of the Taiwan Stock Exchange and Taipei Exchange listed companies from 2005 to 2015, this study empirically shows that, on average, the degree of cost stickiness is lower in the outsider and insider CEOs' earlier years than non-change CEO cases. More importantly, the degree of cost stickiness is lower in the outsider CEOs' earlier years than insider CEOs'. Moreover, the effects of both outsider and insider CEOs' earlier years on cost stickiness are more pronounced in firms with high levels of active institutional ownership. Further, the effects of high levels of active institutional ownership in mitigating the incentive of empire building in outsider CEOs' earlier years are stronger than those in insider CEOs'.