公司治理對財務危機之影響

The Impact of Corporate Governance on Financial Distress

本文主要檢視台灣上市（櫃）公司之公司治理機制對財務危機發生之影響，本研究採用羅吉斯迴歸分析，以2005年至2015年所有台灣上市（櫃）公司為樣本，探討股權結構與董事會監督機制對公司財務危機發生機率之影響。綜觀全文，本文期望說明完備的公司治理監督機制可以降低代理問題，降低財務危機發生機率。實證結果如下：（1）管理者持股與財務危機發生機率呈顯著負相關，支持利益收斂假說。（2）控制權與現金流量請求權偏離程度愈大，財務危機發生機率愈大。（3）董監事持股質押比率與財務危機發生機率呈顯著正相關。（4）機構投資人持股比率與財務危機發生機率呈顯著負相關。（5）財務危機發生機率隨著董事會規模及獨立董事比率而下降，但隨著董事長兼任總經理上升。（6）資訊揭露程度與財務危機發生機率呈顯著負相關。 The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of corporate governance on financialdistress. The sample of the study consists of public companies in Taiwan for the period from2005 to 2015. The study explore the relation between ownership structure, boardcharacteristics and financial distress by Logistic regression analysis. Overall, this paperexpects to explain corporate governance can reduce agency problem and the efficientcorporate governance can decrease financial distress.The empirical results indicate as follows：First, the relationship between managerialownership and financial distress has a significantly negative correlation and hence supportsconvergence of interest hypothesis. Second, as controlling right deviates from cash flowright, financial distress is getting worse, that is, core agency problem become more seriousin the firm. Third, the relationship between pledged share ratio of directors and financialdistress has a significantly positive correlation. Fourth, the relationship between the sharesof institutional investor and financial distress has a significantly negative correlation. Fifth,the number of board directors and the ratio of independent directors have negativerelationship with financial distress, but the CEO and chairman being the same person havepositive relationship with financial distress. Finally, the information disclosure level hasnegative relationship with financial distress.