實力派股東本位公司法制的實踐、衝突與改革：以股東會決議爭議為中心

The Shaping and Reshaping of the Blockholder-Centric Model of Corporate Law in Taiwan: The Example of Shareholder Resolution Regime

本文認為我國股份有限公司法制可以說是一種以實力派股東為本位所設計之模式。此一模式源起於國民政府於29年所訂定之特種股份有限公司條例，其目的在使特種股份有限公司優先適用本條例，並可豁免於18年公司法中之某些規定的適用。鑑於特種股份有限公司是一種股份基本上全由政府以及其他實力派股東所持有之公司，此一條例可說是專為實力派股東組成之公司所量身定做。在35年及55年進行公司法改革後，此一實力派股東本位之設計進一步被強化。相對之下，35年修法引進之有限公司法制，雖一開始亦屬實力派股東本位的模式，惟日後的修正卻使其逐步偏離。基於實力派股東本位的理解，可以讓吾人對於股東會決議的爭議問題有進一步的認識。一方面，本文認為司法實務主流見解基本上符合實力派股東本位法制的精神。另一方面，吾人也可以看出過去所進行的部分法規修正，並未正視其以實力派股東為本位的法制基礎。因此，該等修正雖然立意良善，卻可能弊大於利。本文主張改革必須從兩個面向進行，一則改善現有的實力派股東本位法制，以使現存公司得妥善適用，另則創造另一套非實力派股東本位之法制，以供未來設立的公司選擇適用。 This article proposes that Taiwan’s legal regime on corporations can be labeled as a blockholder-centric model. The model originates from the Special Corporation Act of 1940 promulgated by the Nationalist government, which aimed at exempting the special corporations from certain rules in the Republic of China Company Law of 1929. At the time when the Special Corporation Act of 1940 was enacted, the shareholding of each special corporation was mostly in the hands of the government and other blockholders. In light of the foregoing, the Special Corporation Act of 1940 was custom-made for the business entities comprised only of blockholders. Moreover, the overhaul of the Republic of China Company Law in 1946 and 1966 respectively put rules in place to reinforce the blockholder-centric model. In comparison, by looking into the evolution of the legal regime on limited liability company, it shows that the legal form and rules of limited liability company were first created in 1946 based on the same blockholder-centric model. However, the following revisions of this regime have gradually shifted away from the model since then. Understandings gained from the progression of the blockholder-centric model can shed new light on several controversies concerning shareholder resolutions. On one hand, it reveals that the mainstream judicial opinions on several controversial cases are aligned with the blockholder-centric model. On the other hand, it demonstrates that some revisions on legal rules have been made without taking into account the model that the previous rules derived from. Therefore, these revisions while well-intentioned might do more harm than good. This article suggests that two lines of reform be initiated and implemented. We shall first make sure rules governing the existing corporations are complementary to the blockholder-centric model. In addition, another model with a different set of rules shall be created for future business entities to choose to be subject to.