亞里斯多德對柏拉圖靈魂劃分之批判

Aristotle's Criticism of the Platonic Division of the Soul

亞理斯多德在《論靈魂》第三書第九章，對柏拉圖的靈魂劃分作出相當嚴厲的批判。他指出，無論是柏拉圖的靈魂三分（「理性」、「意氣」、「慾望」），還是柏拉圖主義者所抱持，一般流行的靈魂二分（擁有理性」與「缺乏理性」兩部分），都有相當大的問題。因為，首先，按照柏拉圖的靈魂劃分方式，靈魂可以是無限被劃分的。其次，柏拉圖的靈魂劃分，完全忽略了「吸收養分」的能力，其實是一種獨立的靈魂能力，而不能與其它靈魂部分或能力混為一談。再者，按照靈魂二分的方式，知覺該歸類為「擁有理性」還是「缺乏理性」的部分，也不清楚。最後，亞理斯多德認為，柏拉圖靈魂劃分的最不合理之處，在於將原本單一的「欲求能力」分割開，以致於在理性部分中出現了「希求」，在「缺乏理性」部分中又出現了「慾望」與「意氣」等，以致於在靈魂三部份中，每一部份都會有欲求。本文打算依次檢視這些批判。此外，本文打算提出的一個觀點是，亞理斯多德對柏拉圖靈魂劃分之批判，符合他一般對柏拉圖哲學的批判方式：J. Annas與G. Fine皆指出，亞理斯多德在批評柏拉圖理型論時，通常會相當嚴格地堅持柏拉圖文本上的文字意義，但不肯從柏拉圖的角度與哲學立場，寬大、善意地解讀這些文字；反之，亞理斯多德經常會根據自己的一些預設與哲學見解，嚴格地檢驗柏拉圖文本中的字句，有時他甚至會將柏拉圖的說法脫離原有的脈絡來解讀。當然，亞理斯多德這麼作的理由，並非是為了刻意刁難柏拉圖，而是為了從柏拉圖哲學中得出某些重要的哲學意涵，並藉此顯示自身哲學立場的合理性。本文將顯示，亞理斯多德對柏拉圖靈魂劃分的批判，充分展現了這種批判方式的特點。 In ＂De Anima＂ III 9, Aristotle raises a series of criticisms against the Platonic division of the soul. He firstly indicates that the parts of the soul seem to be infinite, and not confined to the calculative, spirited, and the appetitive part, as Plato describes. Secondly, Plato's tripartition of the soul almost neglects the nutritive part as an independent capacity of the soul. Moreover, although the Platonists simplifies Plato's tripartition and transformed it into a bipartition, it is not easy to assign the perceptive part either to the rational or the irrational part. Finally, Aristotle thinks that it is totally unreasonable for the Platonic soul-division to split the desiderative part up, which should be one and single capacity of the soul; for then there would be wish in the calculative, appetite and spirit in the irrational part, such that in each part of the soul there would be desire. In this article I shall explain these criticisms respectively. However, I will not treat them as though they were isolated, but will show that they belong to Aristotle's overall criticism against Platonism. J. Annas and G. Fine have suggested that in criticizing Plato's theory of forms, Aristotle usually finds fault with this theory in an uncharitable and even narrow way. Sometimes he takes an inexact and vague Platonic claim, and provides one literal and natural reading of it on which he then proceeds to attack. Sometimes he reads a Platonic claim not in a way Plato would accept, but in a way which derives from the assumptions of his own metaphysics or from his own understandings about Platonism. Sometimes he criticizes a Platonic argument even in isolation from the original context in Plato's dialogues. In so doing, however, Aristotle does not intend to misinterpret Plato; his aim is not to record Plato's arguments straightforwardly, but rather to reconstruct them in a way that will provide philosophical illumination, so that we can learn something important about Platonism and the plausibility of Aristotle's alternative. This article will show that in principle, Aristotle's criticisms of the Platonic soul-division are compatible with his general mode of criticism against Platonism.