語意理論與可及原則

The Semantic Theory and the Availability Principle

This paper aims to defend François Recanati's Availability Principle approach to semantics by illuminating and responding to two major challenges from minimalists, in particular from Emma Borg: the first concerns the notion of intuitive content and ＂awareness-of＂ presupposed in the Availability Principle, and the second concerns whether the principle makes a semantic theory unfit with normativity and compositionality. I lead the discussion toward the kernel question-the bearer of the semantic content-and show that the Availability Principle is appropriate if we respect the empirical basis of meaning. 本文試圖替François Recanati回應以Emma Borg為主的兩面向批評，而得以闡明並辯護其所主張的可及原則：其一面向是關於可及原則所預設的「直覺內容」與「意識到」兩概念，其二面向是關於是否滿足可及原則會使的語意理論無法滿足語言的規範性與組構性。我將引導此爭論至問題核心－－即語意內容的承載者－－重新審視何以一般咸認為語句本身有其客觀、不受脈絡影響而改變的語意內容，並論證若我們顧及意義的經驗基礎，則可及原則是恰當的。