多重代理問題應用在政府部門租稅查核之優勢策略分析

The Analysis of Dominant Strategy under Multiple Principal-Agent in Tax Auditing of Government Department

近年來企業舞弊事件層出不窮，管理階層因為自身的利益，透過操弄財務報表，造成許多企業舞弊事件。本研究以理論模型進行分析性研究，探討政府機構為公共的外部審計人員角色時，避免企業透過揭露不實的財務報表資訊，達到避稅的目的。政府機構是否有誘因使其政府的相關人員對企業進行監督的責任，防止企業進行各種手段的逃稅。本研究認為當防弊成本過高時，政府就沒有誘因去監督公司。本研究亦獲得以下結論：1.主理人對於逃漏稅與否的偏好不同，會得到不同的結果。2.代理人的策略決定於代理人獲得的薪資報酬。3.當代理人努力的成本等於努力的水準時，代理人選擇付出低努力，主理人不需逃漏稅，則政府亦不防弊。4.代理人的薪資報酬為努力水準與努力的成本的平均值時，政府應盡監督作用進行防弊維護租稅公平。 During recent years, the corporate fraud incidents seem to be endless and the management level would manipulate financial report for the sake of its own interest. This research intends to explore that the government institution acts in the role of public and external auditor that prevents the enterprises from disclosing false financial information to achieve tax evasion. In addition, whether government institution has the incentive to prod the government related personnel to proceed to their oversight over the enterprise. This research realizes the fact when the cost for fraud prevention is too high government has no incentive to exercise their oversight. This research acquires the following findings: Different preferences of tax evasion for the principal would lead to different outcomes. Strategies committed by the agent would determine the salary compensation for the agent. When the cost of efforts from the agent equates to the level of efforts, then the government to deter the tax evasion as well. When the agent's salary compensation is the average value of the level and the cost of efforts, then the government should proceed to effective tax evasion supervision so as to prevent from any wrongdoings to achieve the tax equity.