銀行業之公司治理機制如何影響銀行風險承擔行為？

How Does Bank Industry’s Corporate Governance Mechanism Impact on Bank Risk-Taking Behavior?

主要探討公司治理機制及「二五八」金改目標宣稱對銀行風險承擔的影響。因本研究所採用的追蹤型資料型態，經由F-test、LM test與Hausman test之驗證顯示，逾放比率模型適用於固定效果模型分析，整體風險模型、廠商特性風險模型與系統風險模型均適用於隨機效果模型分析。實證結果顯示，內部人持股比例與銀行系統風險呈一倒U型的關係，符合「公司控制假說」。機構法人持股比例與系統風險呈顯著負相關，符合「效率監督假說」。董事會規模愈大或存放比率愈高，則逾放比率將降低。銀行特許價值在四種模型中均呈負相關，但關係人借貸比率影響效果並不顯著。再者，「二五八」金改目標宣稱之管制效果並不顯著。 The main purpose of this study is to examine how the corporate governmentmechanism and regulation impact on the Taiwan banking industry’s risk-taking ability.This study collects a panel data set, and applies F-test, LM-test and Hausman test todetermine the best statistical method (ordinary least squares method, fix effects model orrandom effects model). The results suggest an inverse U-shaped relation between insiderownership and systematic risk consistent with corporate control hypothesis. We also find astrong inverse relationship between outsider ownership and systematic risk. As a result,efficient monitoring hypothesis is supported. We also find that the bad loans ratio decreaseas board size or the ratio of loan-to-deposits increase. Bank charter value is negativelycorrelated with various models, and no statistical significant relation is found in regulation.