臺灣與荷蘭蝴蝶蘭產業的競爭策略──最低品質標準或品質改進補貼？

A Strategic Analysis of the Phalaenopsis Orchid Industry in Taiwan and the Netherlands: Minimum Quality Standards or Quality-Upgrading Subsidies?

臺灣「蝴蝶蘭王國」的皇冠已讓位給荷蘭，原因主要是荷蘭蝴蝶蘭之品質在病毒率和雙梗率上都遠超過臺灣。為此，本文建立一個產品具垂直差異的模型以分析兩種政策工具對提升臺灣蝴蝶蘭品質的影響：一為最低品質標準政策，另一為補貼改善蝴蝶蘭品質的投資支出。本文之結果顯示：若政府採行最低品質標準之政策，本國蝴蝶蘭業者之品質會提高，對手國的蝴蝶蘭品質也會上升，而品質差距縮小使得兩國蝴蝶蘭的價格差距亦隨之縮小；另一方面，若政府對提升品質的投資採用補貼政策，在價格、品質或銷售數量上皆和最低品質標準的政策有相同的效果。簡言之，品質改進補貼政策與最低品質標準政策會具有均等性，皆會達到扶助國內蝴蝶蘭業者品質提昇的目的。 The market share of Taiwan's Phalaenopsis orchid has shrunk sharply mainly due to the Netherlands' Phalaenopsis orchid having surpassed Taiwan either in the rate of infection or double stem. In order to analyze this scenario, we set up a model of vertical product differentiation to discuss the influence of two policy tools on the quality of Taiwan's Phalaenopsis orchid industry. The first tool in question is to set a minimum quality standard for the orchid industry, and the second one is to subsidize the orchid industry to the amount of its quality-upgrading expenditure. Our results show that imposing the policy of minimum quality standards raises the quality of both domestic and foreign orchids, and the difference in the quality of the two orchids is also narrowed down which further brings down the price gap. Moreover, adopting a subsidization policy gives rise to the same effect on price, quality and the sales quantities. To sum up, the policy effects are equivalent for the minimum quality standards and quality-upgrading subsidies, which will no doubt help the domestic orchid industry raise its product quality.

The market share of Taiwan's Phalaenopsis orchid has shrunk sharply mainly due to the Netherlands' Phalaenopsis orchid having surpassed Taiwan either in the rate of infection or double stem. In order to analyze this scenario, we set up a model of vertical product differentiation to discuss the influence of two policy tools on the quality of Taiwan's Phalaenopsis orchid industry. The first tool in question is to set a minimum quality standard for the orchid industry, and the second one is to subsidize the orchid industry to the amount of its quality-upgrading expenditure. Our results show that imposing the policy of minimum quality standards raises the quality of both domestic and foreign orchids, and the difference in the quality of the two orchids is also narrowed down which further brings down the price gap. Moreover, adopting a subsidization policy gives rise to the same effect on price, quality and the sales quantities. To sum up, the policy effects are equivalent for the minimum quality standards and quality-upgrading subsidies, which will no doubt help the domestic orchid industry raise its product quality.