考慮社會責任下獨佔廠商的生產與逃漏稅決策

Tax Evasion and Monopoly Output Decisions in the Presence of Corporate Social Responsibility

本文將廠商的社會責任納入Wang and Conant（1988）的模型架構中，重新探討廠商生產與逃漏稅決策兩者之間是否具有可分離性。經由模型的推導分析，我們發現三項主要的結果：其一，在社會責任的考量下，廠商的生產與逃漏稅決策不再具有可分離性，而是具有Edgeworth互補性。其二，當政府提高稽查率或懲罰率，不必然能夠嚇阻廠商的逃漏稅行為。最後，當廠商的社會責任動機提高時，則會同時減少產出水準與逃稅數額。 This paper revisits monopolists' profit tax evasion by taking corporate social responsibility into account. It is shown that: (i) the monopolistic firm's evasion and production decisions are complements in the Edgeworth sense; (ii) the deterrent effects of the penalty rate and the audit probability on tax evasion are ambiguous when monopolistic firms possess a social responsible motive; and (iii) an increase in the monopolistic firm's social responsibility leads to decreases in both its output production and tax evasion.

This paper revisits monopolists' profit tax evasion by taking corporate social responsibility into account. It is shown that: (i) the monopolistic firm's evasion and production decisions are complements in the Edgeworth sense; (ii) the deterrent effects of the penalty rate and the audit probability on tax evasion are ambiguous when monopolistic firms possess a social responsible motive; and (iii) an increase in the monopolistic firm's social responsibility leads to decreases in both its output production and tax evasion.