中國的非正式經濟制裁與對象國的反擊策略：中日稀土衝突為例的分析

China’s Informal Economic Sanctionsand Target Countries’ Responses:The Rare Earths Trade Dispute betweenChina and Japan

本文旨在探討中日釣魚臺主權爭議背後，中國以稀土禁運為武器對日本施加外交壓力，以及日本採取反制措施的外交衝突事件。藉此個案研究，凸顯出中國挾其經貿優勢以施壓經貿對手國的「非正式經濟制裁」模式，以及日本成功地反制中國施壓的經驗教訓。由於日本具有稀土高度依存中國的危機意識，並未雨綢繆地研擬確保稀土穩定供應對策，當中國發動稀土禁運措施時，日本能夠迅速對應「稀土震撼」，並且以中國禁運措施違反WTO規範以及中國加盟WTO的承諾，與歐美國家聯手向WTO提起訴訟，最終迫使中國修正其管制稀土政策。 In this paper, we analyze China’s export restrictions on rare earthelements and Japan’s responses after the Diaoyu Islands dispute in 2010. Weconsider the rare earths trade dispute between China and Japan as a casestudy, where China pressured Japan by its informal economic sanctions andJapan demonstrated an effective counter-attack. Japan was cautious about itsdependence on China’s rare earths and previously prepared strategies fortheir stable supply. When China embargoed rare earths, the Japanesegovernment and companies immediately put their strategies into practice;meanwhile, Japan cooperated with other countries to sue China as itsrestrictions had violated WTO rules. These measures successfully forcedChina to amend its export limitations.

In this paper, we analyze China’s export restrictions on rare earthelements and Japan’s responses after the Diaoyu Islands dispute in 2010. Weconsider the rare earths trade dispute between China and Japan as a casestudy, where China pressured Japan by its informal economic sanctions andJapan demonstrated an effective counter-attack. Japan was cautious about itsdependence on China’s rare earths and previously prepared strategies fortheir stable supply. When China embargoed rare earths, the Japanesegovernment and companies immediately put their strategies into practice;meanwhile, Japan cooperated with other countries to sue China as itsrestrictions had violated WTO rules. These measures successfully forcedChina to amend its export limitations.