從家族企業論析自由現金流量與投資決策之關聯性

The Association between Free Cash Flows and Investment Decisions of Family Firms in Taiwan

本文以1998年至2008年台灣上市櫃公司為研究對象，探討家族企業對於自由現金流量與投資決策關聯性之影響。大部分實證結果顯示，相較於非家族企業，家族企業的自由現金流量為正時，過度投資現象較小，但當自由現金流量為負時，家族企業投資不足情形則較為嚴重。與過去文獻不同，本文發現當控制權與現金流量權偏離較嚴重時，相較於非家族企業，家族企業的自由現金流量為正時，過度投資現象較小。前述結果也許暗示，就籌措資金的觀點而言，控制權與現金流量權偏離程度可能代表家族企業之融資選擇，而非彰顯控制股東與少數股東利益衝突的嚴重性。 This paper investigates how family and non-family firms affect the relation between a firm's investment decisions and free cash flows. Based on a sample of publicly-traded firms in Taiwan from 1998 to 2008, this paper demonstrates that, compared to non-family firms, family firms show smaller over-investment amount when they have positive free cash flows. However, in the case of negative free cash flows, partial results show that family firms under-invest more, compared to non-family firms. Different from those in prior literature, findings in our study show that, when family firms have positive free cash flows and higher levels of deviation of control rights from cash flow rights, family firms' over-investment amount is smaller than non-family firms'. Our results imply that the deviation of control rights from cash flow rights may be an indication of a family firm's funding choice, which in turn affects investment decisions.

This paper investigates how family and non-family firms affect the relation between a firm's investment decisions and free cash flows. Based on a sample of publicly-traded firms in Taiwan from 1998 to 2008, this paper demonstrates that, compared to non-family firms, family firms show smaller over-investment amount when they have positive free cash flows. However, in the case of negative free cash flows, partial results show that family firms under-invest more, compared to non-family firms. Different from those in prior literature, findings in our study show that, when family firms have positive free cash flows and higher levels of deviation of control rights from cash flow rights, family firms' over-investment amount is smaller than non-family firms'. Our results imply that the deviation of control rights from cash flow rights may be an indication of a family firm's funding choice, which in turn affects investment decisions.