制度韌性與台灣半總統制下的災後重建：以九二一地震、莫拉克風災為例

Institutional Resilience and Post-Disaster Reconstruction of Semi-presidentialism in Taiwan: A Study of the 921 Earthquake and Typhoon Morakot

本文以制度韌性為理論基礎，選擇台灣近年重要的災害議題：九二一地震、莫拉克風災，探討源於半總統制憲法所創造的政府運作系統，會如何展現災後重建的佈局、彈性與相應舉措。由於國內過往的災害研究多關注「府際關係」或「公私協力」的面向，亦即分析行政體系對災害衝擊之回應，對於憲政體制在其中的影響較少著墨，因此，本文加入災後重建的政府體制因素，認為地方政府與私部門皆必須同時面對「憲政兩軌」的特性，特別是總統權力之影響。這不但使災後重建工作會因「政治彈性」牽動「府際關係」和「公私協力」之間的「尺度移轉」。另外，總統身為救災體系的最高指揮者，其所關注政權正當性與災害責任的卸除，更可能因總統制軌道的運作近乎取代內閣制軌道，造成行政體系被簡化以及地方參與的被排除。 This article uses institutional resilience theory to explain how Taiwan’s semi-presidential system absorbs the impact of major governance challenges. The paper chooses major disasters that occurred in recent years in Taiwan: the 921 Earthquake and Typhoon Morakot, to discuss how a system of government operations created by a semi-presidential constitution is reflected in the arrangements, flexibility, and corresponding mechanisms of the governance process. Related to the authority of the central government and the oversight role of the president, observers have argued that in Taiwan’s disaster governance process, the central government has continued to control local grassroots action. In addition, the governance network involving cooperation between the central and local governments has been regarded as ignorant of real local needs, because the policy planning and resource distribution rarely represent local interests. This research argues that outside of the legal system, the institutional framework of the semi-presidential system continues to have the ability to regulate and absorb disaster governance. This should be an important explanatory dimension for subsequent research on disaster governance.

This article uses institutional resilience theory to explain how Taiwan’s semi-presidential system absorbs the impact of major governance challenges. The paper chooses major disasters that occurred in recent years in Taiwan: the 921 Earthquake and Typhoon Morakot, to discuss how a system of government operations created by a semi-presidential constitution is reflected in the arrangements, flexibility, and corresponding mechanisms of the governance process. Related to the authority of the central government and the oversight role of the president, observers have argued that in Taiwan’s disaster governance process, the central government has continued to control local grassroots action. In addition, the governance network involving cooperation between the central and local governments has been regarded as ignorant of real local needs, because the policy planning and resource distribution rarely represent local interests. This research argues that outside of the legal system, the institutional framework of the semi-presidential system continues to have the ability to regulate and absorb disaster governance. This should be an important explanatory dimension for subsequent research on disaster governance.