呷碗內、看碗外？選區重疊度與開放性對於議員參與立委提名的影響

Constituency Congruency, Open Seat, and Political Promotion of Local Council Members

地方議員為何以及是否參選區域立委，是政治晉陞的重要課題。本研究認為，當議員選區與立委選區高度重疊時，提供該選區的議員低成本與高效益的參選立委誘因結構。在地方議員與立委選區高度重疊的選區中，地方議員往往有在立委選區經營成本低、與選民高度連結、較高的可辨識度、長期經營導致相對勝選機率較大、以及政治晉陞的累積性優勢。本研究探討 2016 年第九屆立委選舉，國民黨以及民進黨在各自立委提名過程中，議員參與黨內區域立委提名的情形。首先，本研究發現，對於國民黨來說，當議員選區與立委選區重疊度愈高時，該選區愈可能出現議員參與黨內立委提名。不過，對於民進黨來說，選區重疊度並不會直接對於議員參與黨內立委提名的機會造成顯著地影響。再者，過去的研究普遍認為，現任者優勢可能阻斷其他挑戰者的機會。本研究顯示，對於國民黨而言，選區開放性並不會使得選區重疊度對於議員參與黨內立委提名的機會產生不同的影響。不過，對於民進黨來說，相較於有同黨現任者時，選區重疊度對於有無議員參與黨內立委提名的影響效果，在無同黨現任者時較能發揮正向影響作用，這顯示黨內的現任者發揮了嚇阻作用。 Whether and why local council members run for legislative elections are critical issues for political promotion. This study argues that when the constituency of the local councilors highly overlaps with that of the legislators, it provides the local councilors the political incentive structure with lower costs and higher benefits to run for the legislative elections. In those highly overlapped districts, local councilors running for legislative elections have lower costs in familiarizing with the districts, greater connection to the district voters, and higher name recognition, all of which lead to higher possibilities of winning the legislative elections. This study uses the 2016 legislative election to examine both the KMT and DPP’s local councilors’ decisions in running for legislative election nominations. Our findings are the following. Firstly, for the KMT councilors, higher constituency congruency tends to bring about higher possibilities of running for nomination of legislative elections. However, for the DPP councilors, constituency congruencies do not directly affect their decision to run for legislative elections. Furthermore, past studies have indicated that the impact of constituency congruency on political promotion is greatly affected by the scare-off effect of the incumbents. For the KMT councilors, the scare-off effect of the incumbent does not change the impact of constituency congruency on councilors’ running for legislative elections. However, for the DPP councilors, the impact of district congruency on whether to run for legislative election or not is conditional upon whether the legislative districts are with or without same-party incumbents. The constituency-congruencyeffect in encouraging the DPP’s councilors’ running for the legislative election only occurs when there are no same-party incumbents.

Whether and why local council members run for legislative elections are critical issues for political promotion. This study argues that when the constituency of the local councilors highly overlaps with that of the legislators, it provides the local councilors the political incentive structure with lower costs and higher benefits to run for the legislative elections. In those highly overlapped districts, local councilors running for legislative elections have lower costs in familiarizing with the districts, greater connection to the district voters, and higher name recognition, all of which lead to higher possibilities of winning the legislative elections. This study uses the 2016 legislative election to examine both the KMT and DPP’s local councilors’ decisions in running for legislative election nominations. Our findings are the following. Firstly, for the KMT councilors, higher constituency congruency tends to bring about higher possibilities of running for nomination of legislative elections. However, for the DPP councilors, constituency congruencies do not directly affect their decision to run for legislative elections. Furthermore, past studies have indicated that the impact of constituency congruency on political promotion is greatly affected by the scare-off effect of the incumbents. For the KMT councilors, the scare-off effect of the incumbent does not change the impact of constituency congruency on councilors’ running for legislative elections. However, for the DPP councilors, the impact of district congruency on whether to run for legislative election or not is conditional upon whether the legislative districts are with or without same-party incumbents. The constituency-congruencyeffect in encouraging the DPP’s councilors’ running for the legislative election only occurs when there are no same-party incumbents.