盈餘管理與公司治理關聯性：以中國銀行業為例

The Relationship between Earnings Management and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Chinese Banking Industry

本研究使用壞帳費用裁量應計數衡量盈餘管理傾向，探討中國銀行業的盈餘管理與公司治理關聯性。以38家銀行為研究樣本，研究期間從2007至2013年。實證結果發現，中國銀行業藉由少（多）提列壞帳費用，增加（減少）盈餘，進行盈餘管理，資本準備充足的銀行願意多提列壞帳費用。實證結果亦顯示董事會規模與大股東持股無法降低盈餘管理，特別是上市銀行與低獲利組。儘管在金融風暴期外資持股有正向的監督效果，整體而言，中國銀行業的公司治理機能並未彰顯。高獲利與負向盈餘管理組均顯示，國有程度越高，提列較多的壞帳費用，隱含法規遵循傾向較高。 This study uses discretionary loan loss provisions to capture bank managers’ propensity for earnings management. This purpose is to investigate the relationship between earnings management and corporate governance in Chinese banking industry. The sample consists of 38 banks, spanning the period from 2007 to 2013. This research finds that banks in China set aside less (more) loan loss provisions to increase (decrease) earnings. Sound banks would like to set aside more loan loss provisions. Empirical results also indicate that board size and large-block shareholders could not decrease earnings management, especially for the listed banks and the group with lower profitability. Taken as a whole, corporate government in Chinese banking industry did not work, even foreign strategic shareholders had a positive monitoring effect during the period of financial crisis. Both groups of higher profitability and negative earnings management show that the higher level of state ownership sets aside more loan loss provisions, which implies the higher propensity of regulatory compliance.

This study uses discretionary loan loss provisions to capture bank managers’ propensity for earnings management. This purpose is to investigate the relationship between earnings management and corporate governance in Chinese banking industry. The sample consists of 38 banks, spanning the period from 2007 to 2013. This research finds that banks in China set aside less (more) loan loss provisions to increase (decrease) earnings. Sound banks would like to set aside more loan loss provisions. Empirical results also indicate that board size and large-block shareholders could not decrease earnings management, especially for the listed banks and the group with lower profitability. Taken as a whole, corporate government in Chinese banking industry did not work, even foreign strategic shareholders had a positive monitoring effect during the period of financial crisis. Both groups of higher profitability and negative earnings management show that the higher level of state ownership sets aside more loan loss provisions, which implies the higher propensity of regulatory compliance.