| 中文摘要 |
This study investigates the effect of a board of directors with experience in the banking sector on the features of syndicated loans. We argue that the inclusion of directors with banking experience on the board may alleviate information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders, thereby reducing loan spreads and affecting the portion of the loan retained by the lead arrangers. Moreover, directors with banking experience can assist firms with high information asymmetry, to obtain loans on better price term and influence the share of lead arrangers. We test these predictions empirically using a sample of syndicated loans made to US firms over the period of 2001 to 2014 (excluding the years 2008 and 2009). Our empirical results suggest that firms that have directors with more banking experience enjoy lower syndicated loan spreads. We also find that directors with banking experience do not influence the share of loans retained by lead arrangers. We then divide the sample into high and low information asymmetry groups. The evidence suggests that among firms with high information asymmetry, directors with banking experience are negatively associated with loan spreads and positively associated with the proportion of loan facility held by lead arrangers. These relationships are not observed in firms with low information asymmetry.
本研究探討具銀行相關經驗的董事對聯合貸款特性之影響。董事具銀行相關經驗應能降低借款企業與銀行間的資訊不對稱，而使得借款企業取得較低的聯貸利差，並影響主辦銀行之放貸比率。此外，對於資訊不對稱較高之企業，本研究預期具銀行相關背景董事較能有效降低其聯貸利差，並對主辦銀行之放貸比率有影響。本研究以2001至2014年（不含2008及2009年）之樣本進行實證研究。研究結果顯示，具銀行相關經驗之董事與聯貸利差呈負相關，而與主辦銀行之放貸比率無關聯性。而進一步將樣本區分為高資訊不對稱及低資訊不對稱兩個子樣本後的研究結果顯示，對於高資訊不對稱之企業，具銀行相關經驗之董事與聯貸利差呈負相關，並與主辦銀行之放貸比率呈正相關；而於低資訊不對稱之企業，則未發現具銀行相關經驗之董事與聯貸利差及主辦銀行之放貸比率具關聯性。 |
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