原則、情境與道德規範性

Principles, Situations, and the Normativity of Morality

當代道德個別主義者Jonathan Dancy主張，道德實踐不依賴道德原則，原則也不存在。他認為，同一類行為之每一行為個例的道德意義都不一樣。依據個別主義，如果有原則，必定有例外，原則之間也必有衝突。這篇論文提出一個原則主義的論述。這個原則主義反對個別主義且認為，道德需要原則。這個原則主義基於對原則的概念理解而論說，原則具有一組形上特性與功能可以化解個別主義的批評，而且，原則主義的道德觀可以說明道德的一致性以及道德對於情境的敏感性。

Contemporary moral particularists like Jonathan Dancy argue that the possibility of morality does not depend on moral principles. He maintains that principles do not exist. According to particularism, if there were any moral principle, there would have to be exceptions to it; if there were plurality of principles, they would necessarily tend to come into conflict. This paper attempts a defense of the need for and existence of moral principles. Such a defense is a form of principlism which will be argued for and explained by this paper. This defense begins with a conceptual understanding of principle which gives rise to some metaphysical features and functions of principles. In virtue of these features and functions, the proposed principlism is able to meet the particularist criticisms. More importantly, this principlist view of morality is able to give an account of moral consistency and the contextual sensitivity of morality.