基於“同一事實”的訴的客觀合併

The Aggregation of Claims in the Context of the Same Occurrence

在訴訟標的舊實體法說理論框架內，基於“同一事實”產生的數個實體請求權成立數個訴。請求權之間差異化的相互關係，導致產生不同的訴的客觀合併形態：其一，請求權競合時，應區分律師代理與本人訴訟分別設立預備合併與選擇合併的程序構造，現行規範割裂了請求權競合的程序構造與其實體屬性之間的協調關係，錯誤地否定了請求權競合時訴的客觀合併形態，強制其為單一之訴；其二，《民訴法解釋》第247條為實踐中出現的客觀預備合併之訴提供了正當依據，應當肯定客觀預備合併的合法性，並在此基礎上鼓勵適用；其三，對於有緊密事實牽連的單純合併，如果在訴訟標的識別上採用“同一事實”標準，則導致由單純合併向強制合併的轉化，因此應將“同一事實”標準嚴格限定於舊實體法說無法識別實質性重複訴訟時。

According to the theory of traditional substantial law, several claims resulting from the same occurrence constitute several independent suits. The diverse relationships among the claims determine various forms of aggregation of subject matter of claims in the procedure. Firstly, the procedural construction of concurrence of claims should be preliminary aggregation when there is a lawyer or selective aggregation when there is not. Current regulations ignore the consistency between the procedural construction and substantial nature when concurrence happens, which leads to an outcome of rejecting aggregation of claims. Secondly, taking into consideration that the preliminaiy aggregation has already occurred in practice, and Article 247 of Judicial Interpretation of the Civil Procedure Law has proved its legitimate basis, we should make effort to encourage the application of preliminary aggregation. Thirdly, as to the aggregation of claims which have a tight factual relation, a simple aggregation might turn to a compulsory one because of choosing 'one occurrence' test, so we should confine the use of such test only when traditional test cannot tell real repetitive litigations.