反傾銷政策與反傾銷報復

Anti-Dumping Policy and Anti-Dumping Retaliation

本文分析存在反傾銷報復的威脅下，一國廠商提出反傾銷保護的誘因。我們檢視反傾銷報復可能發生的原因與反傾銷報復是否會阻卻面對傾銷的廠商提出反傾銷保護的誘因。本文發現本國政府的反傾銷保護有可能導致本國廠商在外國傾銷，在此一情形下，外國廠商將提出反傾銷保護進而導致反傾銷報復的發生。我們進一步地發現反傾銷的報復並不會降低廠商提出反傾銷保護的誘因。最後，我們檢視了存在反傾銷報復下，反傾銷稅的福利效果。我們發現反傾銷稅仍有可能使得本國的社會福利上升。

This paper analyzes the incentives to petition for anti-dumping protection in the context of anti-dumping retaliation. We examine how anti-dumping retaliation may arise and whether such retaliation can be a threat that dissuades a domestic firm facing dumping from first petitioning for anti-dumping protection. The findings show that the anti-dumping duty imposed by the domestic country may result in dumping in the foreign country. Under such a circumstance, the foreign firm will petition for anti-dumping protection, and thus anti-dumping retaliation arises. We further show that firms facing foreign retaliation still have the incentive to first petition for anti-dumping protection. Finally, we investigate the welfare effects of a domestic anti-dumping duty in the context of a threat of foreign anti-dumping retaliation. We note that it may be socially desirable for the domestic country to implement an anti-dumping duty on a foreign dumping firm.