企業高薪低報對台灣勞保退休年金及經濟成長影響之分析

AN INVESTIGATION OF THE INFLUENCE OF ENTERPRISES UNDERREPORTING WAGE UPON LABOR INSURANCE RETIREMENT ANNUITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

本文建構一個具有內生成長特性的跨期替代模型，並假設勞保制度在隨收隨付制度（）下，分析企業高薪低報的行為對於勞保退休年金與經濟成長之影響。另外研究政府實施勞保政策時，對於經濟成長、所得替代率與勞保退休年金總額所帶來之衝擊。研究發現提高勞保費率將造成企業薪資低報的行為更為嚴重，不利於經濟成長；而且調高勞保費率可能會降低勞保退休年金的總額。此外，薪資低報成本相似於逃稅成本，較低的薪資低報成本有助於提高經濟成長，增加所得替代率，但反將導致勞工的勞保退休年金總額減少。至於有關懲罰雇主高薪低報的策略，分別有稽查機率與懲罰綠兩種，加強稽查或加重懲罰均將使得經濟成長率與所得替代率下跌，但卻都有利於增加勞工的勞保退休年金之累積，而且懲罰率策略在增加勞保退休金方面之效率會高於加強勞保稽查策略。

In this paper we build a model of endogenous growth in overlapping generations (OLG) with a pay-as-you-go labor insurance system to analyze the impact of employer under-reporting of employees’ income on the labor insurance retirement annuity and the economic growth. We also investigate the effects of government policies on economic growth, the income replacement rate, and the total amount of labor insurance annuity. Research finds that an increase of the labor insurance premium rate has a negative effect on economic growth because it will cause an increasing tendency of employers to under-report employees’ income. In addition, an increase in the labor insurance premium rate may reduce the total amount of labor insurance retirement annuity. In addition, the cost of underreporting wage is similar to cost of tax evasion. The lower cost of underreporting wages can contribute to economic growth and increase the income replacement rate, but it will result in a decrease in the amount of labor insurance retirement annuity. There are two government policies used to punish employers who under-report wages, including detection probability and punishment rate. Both policies have positive effects on labor insurance retirement annuity. Furthermore, the efficiency of punishment rate is better than detection probability.