均衡失業與成長──收益分紅與工會談判

Equilibrium Unemployment and Growth: The Role of Revenue Sharing and Bargaining Institutions

本文建構一個內生成長模型，其中考慮：（1）工會談判造成均衡失業，（2）勞動薪資與收益／利潤分紅有關。在這樣的設定下，本文證明，於一個包含工會且採取收益分紅的成長模型，失業與經濟成長可能呈現一正向關係，因而試圖針對實證上高失業可能伴隨高經濟成長的現象給予一理論上的解釋。同時，本文也發現，在一個採取收益分紅制度的經濟體系中，工會與經濟成長並非存在一單調的關係，而是取決於談判的方式，這樣的結果協調了理論與實證不宜至的現象。此外，本文亦分別考慮充分就業模型與包含分紅工資制度的均衡失業模型底下，比較消費稅的成長效果。本文發現，若勞動與休閒缺少抵換關係，不論於收益或利潤分紅制度之下，消費稅的增加對經濟成長皆存在正向效果。

This paper constructs an endogenous growth model in which (i) union wage bargaining causes equilibrium unemployment; and (ii) revenue/profit sharing is related to workers’ compensation. In this setup, we prove that under a revenue sharing scheme, a growing unionized economy may be characterized by a positive relationship between unemployment and growth and, accordingly, we provide a theoretical explanation as to why in reality high unemployment can be quite compatible with high economic growth. We also find that, in an economy with revenue sharing, unionization does not exhibit a monotonic relationship with growth, but crucially depends upon the bargaining institution. This result reconciles the discrepancy between the existing theory and empirical observation. Besides, we make a comparison concerning the growth effect of a consumption tax in a full-employment economy with that in a share economy with equilibrium unemployment. It is shown that without a labor-leisure trade-off, a consumption tax has a positive effect on economic growth under either a revenue sharing scheme or a profit sharing scheme.