再探台灣車體保險之道德危險──以2005至2007年資料為證

A REVISIT FOR THE MORAL HAZARD OF COMPREHENSIVE AUTO INSURANCE IN TAIWAN: EVIDENCE FROM 2005 TO 2007

在台灣產物保險業費率自由化之後，保險人將風險資訊反應至保費計算已有明顯的差異，而檢證道德危險是否存於台灣車體保險之實證研究多取自費率自由化前之資料，故本研究以費率自由化後之資料再次檢證此重要議題。剔除提高保障之動機最有可能來自於受到學習效果影響的保單，在切齊保單的理賠範圍後，研究發現初次投保丙式車體保險之被保險人於續保年度轉換為免自負額乙式車體保險有負面的動機效果。本文的實證效果並無法確認初次投保有自負額乙式車體保險之被保險人於續保年度轉換至免自負額乙式車體保險是否有動機效果。本文推論理賠範圍的擴展較自負額的降低使被保險人產生較強的負面動機。

As to incorporate insured’s risk information to calculate benefits premium, there was an obvious change after premium rate deregulation of property and casualty insurance in Taiwan. Since most studies of moral hazard in comprehensive automobile insurance in Taiwan used data before the premium rate deregulation, this study turns to analyze the same issue by using data after it. After eliminating policies when policyholders switched their policies to different contract form most likely due to a learning effect and to make the claim conditions of the renewal form coincide with those of the initial form, a negative incentive effect was found to exist when policyholders switched their policies from form C to non-deductible form B. But the negative incentive effect was not found when policyholders switched their policies from deductible form B to non-deductible form B. I conclude that increasing coverage items provided more negative incentives than canceling deductibles.