進口競爭、廠商搭售與研發

IMPORT COMPETITION FIRM S BUNDLING AND INNOVATION

在網景與微軟的爭議中，網景認為微軟的搭售行為會扼殺產業之研發。此一觀點獲歐盟之採納，並對微軟作出嚴厲之處分。本文設立一個兩國兩廠商兩類型產品的理論模型，分析當廠商進行Bertrand或Cournot競爭時，外國廠商的搭售行為對產業研發、本國廠商利潤、消費者剩餘以及社會福利的影響。假定產品1僅由外國（搭售）廠商生產，產品2則同時由本國與外國廠商生產，此二產品互為獨立品且兩廠商針對產品2進行研發競爭，本文發現在Bertrand競爭下，外國廠商之搭售行為將使外國廠商的研發水準下降、本國廠商之研發水準增加；但在Cournot競爭時，兩廠商的研發水準皆下降。此外，不論廠商間競爭的方式為何，搭售會使本國廠商利潤上升以及市場總研發水準、本國消費者剩餘及社會福利皆下降。

In the dispute between Netscape and Microsoft, Netscape argued that Microsoft’s bundling practices stifle innovation in the industry. The European Commission accepted the argument and punished Microsoft. This paper sets up a duopoly model with one domestic firm and one foreign firm to analyze the effects of bundling behavior by the foreign firm on the innovation and profit of the domestic firm, consumer surplus, and social welfare under Bertrand or Cournot competition. There are two products in the model in which product 1 is produced only by the foreign firm and product 2 is produced by both firms. Assuming that the two goods are independent in demand and the two firms engage in innovation only for product 2, we find that the bundling practice decreases the foreign firm’s innovation, but increases the domestic firm’s innovation under Bertrand competition. However, it decreases both firms’ innovation. Moreover, the bundling practice always increases the domestic firm’s profits and innovation of the industry, and reduces the domestic consumer surplus and welfare.