考量航空公司競爭行為之國內航線票價管制策略

PRICE REGULATION STRATEGIES FOR DOMESTIC AIR ROUTES WITH CONSIDERATION OF AIRLINE COMPETITION BEHAVIORS

我國國內航空市場實施票價上下限管制，惟目前之票價管制方法恐使經營較無效率之公司，享有較高之票價上限，且此管制方法並未考量航空公司之經營管理與競爭行為。為了解各航線之票價上下限管制對社會福利的影響，本研究以雙層賽局來討論政府管制下航空公司的競爭，上層為政府追求社會福利最大化下之票價上下限管制；下層為航空公司在票價管制、航空器能量等限制下之票價及班次之競爭行為，以追求利潤最大化。本研究以我國國內線航空市場為分析對象，以了解模式之適用性。就所設定之3種情境結果視之，國內航線應區分為兩套管制標準，即對於競爭航線應放寬票價之上下限管制，而對於獨占航線應採取較嚴格之票價上下限管制。

The domestic air transport market in Taiwan is governed by ceiling and floor prices regulations. According to current pricing regulations, less efficient airlines enjoy highly-regulated prices but not yield management or consideration of airlines’ competition behavior. To understand the effect of regulated ceiling and floor prices for each air route on social welfare, a bi-level game-theoretical model is developed. The upper level aims to determine the optimal regulated ceiling and floor prices to maximize social welfare, while the lower level determines the competition behaviors of domestic air transport markets for maximizing their own profits by optimally setting prices and service frequencies subject to regulated ceiling and floor prices and airline capacity. A case study on the Taiwanese domestic air market is conducted to show the applicability of the proposed model. The results suggest that stricter and looser price regulation schemes should be proposed for monopolistic air routes and competitive air routes, respectively.