交通建設BOT計畫特許年期與權利金議題談判模式之研究

A BARGAINING MODEL FOR CONCESSION PERIOD AND ROYALTY FOR TRANSPORTATION BOT PROJECTS

BOT計畫之權利金與特許年期為特許契約的重要談判議題。雖然已有文獻對特許期限或權利金收取與訂定有所探討；但是，過去少有文獻對權利金與特許年期議題進行雙議題談判研究分析。因此，本研究運用Rubinstein議價賽局理論，構建權利金與特許年期的雙議題談判模式。本研究有別於過去文獻所進行的權利金談判模式，將折現因子、議價成本、談判次數、談判能力、談判起始值與談判次數限制等變數納入模式，藉以詮釋政府與最優申請人對權利金及特許年期雙議題的談判行為。透過本研究模式，政府與最優申請人可根據各議題之權重，進而決定其最適之權利金與特許年期的談判結果，從而可獲得雙邊報酬最大的最佳協議解與報酬最小的最劣解。經由本模式之驗證結果顯示，本研究所構建雙議題談判模式可詮釋雙方在BOT契約之權利金與特許年期共同議價過程，此模式可作為BOT特許契約雙議題談判分析之參考。

The royalty and concession period of contract are important negotiation issues in BOT concession contract. However, issues of royalty and concession period do not have a reasonable standard to follow at present, and the both issues of royalty and concession period negotiation model have seldom been explored in the past studies. So this study established the bargaining model for concession period and royalty issues through the Rubinstein bargaining game theory for transportation BOT projects, which is different from the past single-issue bargaining model. The bargaining model includes discount factor, bargaining cost, negotiation ability, negotiation starting value, the number of negotiation and the number of negotiation restrictions. Through the model of this study, both the government and the optimal applicant can determinate the most appropriate outcome of the negotiations after weighing each issue, and they can also find the optimal agreement solution of their own largest reward and the worst solution of their smallest reward. In addition, the resulting model enabled a better understanding of the BOT concession negotiation process. Moreover, the study can provide a BOT negotiation strategy for both decision- makers and administrative department with some BOT policy amendments.