應用賽局理論研擬高速鐵路通車後之國道客運競爭策略

APPLYING GAME THEORY ON STRATEGIC PLANNING OF FREEWAY BUSES IN COMPETING WITH HIGH SPEED RAIL 

有鑒於高速鐵路通車營運後，挾其快速、準點及運量大等優勢，已造成現有臺灣西部城際運輸市場之重大衝擊。為了解國道客運業者所面臨之挑戰，以及未來是否應朝整合方式經營。在高速鐵路通車衝擊部分，本研究係應用非合作賽局，求解各競爭運具之市場均衡票價。在國道客運業者聯營可行性分析部分，則應用合作賽局，求解各國道客運公司在不同聯營情境之票價均衡解，並計算其夏普利值，以了解國道客運業者之利潤分配情況，並以社會福利是否增加，作為判斷聯營正當性之依據。最後，本研究以臺北─臺中路線為例，進行模式之實證分析。

Taiwan High Speed Rail (THSR), a new competitor that offers fast, reliable, and frequent services, has had a great impact on the transportation market of Taiwan’s western corridor. To evaluate the impacts on freeway buses and other competitors and to assess the possibility of cooperation among freeway buses, we formulate profit functions of these carriers as a tool to study various before-and-after scenarios resulting from THSR operations. Next, we apply the non-cooperative game approach to analyze the interaction among THSR, freeway buses, and other modes of transportation along the corridor, and we employ cooperative game to resolve the cooperative strategies among freeway bus companies. Through the construction of the payoff functions and the solutions of market equilibrium, we find the optimal pricing strategies for freeway buses under various cooperative scenarios and compute the Shapley values which provide the guidance of profit-sharing in the cooperative game. Moreover, the necessity of all-in-one coalition is justified by the improvement of social welfare. In the case study, data collected from Taipei-Taichung market are used for model empirical analysis.