自願性與強制性設置薪酬委員會對高階經理人薪酬績效敏感性之影響

The Effect of Voluntary Versus Mandatory Compensation Committee Formation on Top Managers’ Pay Performance Sensitivity

本研究主要目的為探討自願性與強制性設置薪酬委員會對高階經理人薪酬績效敏感性之影響。本研究以2011 年及2014 年為研究期間，排除金融業之台灣上市櫃公司為研究對象，使用薪資及現金紅利作為高階經理人薪酬之代理變數，薪酬委員會品質包含薪酬委員會規模、每年開會次數、委員出席率以及獨立董事比率等四項特性並採主成分分析法 (principal component analysis) 建立綜合指標，以兩階段估計方法 (two-stage method) 分析薪酬委員會的品質對於高階經理人薪酬績效敏感性之影響。研究結果發現，薪酬委員會品質越高，高階經理人薪酬績效敏感性越強。另外，在強制設立薪酬委員會後，相較自願公司，非自願設置薪酬委員會公司其高階經理人薪酬績效敏感性較強。

The objective of this study is to investigate the effect of voluntary versus mandatorycompensation committee formation on top managers’ pay performance sensitivity. For thisstudy, we selected the publicly traded companies in the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ)database for fiscal years 2011–2014. We first used a two-stage least square regressionmodel to examine the effect of compensation committee quality on top managers’ payperformance sensitivity. Then, we apply a two-stage least square regression model toexamine the effect of voluntary versus mandatory compensation committee formationon top managers’ pay performance sensitivity. The results from our empirical analysesindicate that the quality of the compensation committee strengthens the top managers’pay performance sensitivity. They also indicate that the relationship between the topmanagers’ compensation and corporate performance is much stronger in companies thatestablished compensation committees non-voluntarily as compared to companies thatestablished it voluntarily.