相對績效評估與高階經理人薪酬：論企業生命週期之影響

Relative Performance Evaluation and Top Managers’ Compensation: The Effect of the Firm Life Cycle

本研究檢驗高階經理人薪酬合約是否採用相對績效評估（Relative PerformanceEvaluation，簡稱RPE）及企業生命週期階段是否影響相對績效評估之採用。先前關於高階經理人薪酬合約是否採用RPE 的文獻相當分歧，本研究以更精確的子產業分類重新檢驗高階經理人薪酬是否存在採用RPE 的現象，以及RPE之採用是否受到企業生命週期之影響。本研究發現高階經理人總薪酬可能未採用RPE，但紅利薪酬則有，推論為紅利薪酬於期末決定，會進行同業比較，而同業績效已於期初影響高階經理人薪酬之設定，故本期高階經理人總薪酬與本期同業績效較無相關性。此外，也發現當企業生命週期於成長期或衰退期時，高階經理人現金紅利採用RPE 情況並不顯著，但於成熟期時，因為市場競爭因素導致現金紅利有採用RPE 情形。

This study examines the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) and whetherfirm life cycle stages affect the use of RPE. Prior empirical research still offers mixedevidence on the use of RPE in top managers’ compensation because of rough industrialclassification. Accordingly, we re-test the RPE argument by more precise industrialclassification. We find that top managers’ total compensation exhibits little use ofRPE. However, RPE is more prevalent for top managers’ profit sharing schemes. Theexplanation is that firms can incorporate peer performance to decide top managers’ bonusat the end of the period and past peer performance have influenced top managers’ fixedsalary set at the beginning of the year. In addition, we find that firm In growth and declinestages, there is little evidence concerning the use of RPE in cash bonus. Conversely, RPEis used in determining top managers’ cash bonus for firms in maturity stage because ofmore industrial competition.