英文摘要 |
This paper investigates why perks are high, how perks are related to bankperformance, and which monitoring function works in the Chinese banking sector.Results show that stronger CEO power, CEOs with political ties, larger banks, andolder banks are all associated with higher perks. Although we are unable to find asignificant relationship between perks and entrenchment, banks with high perksunderperform versus those with low perks. The relationship between perks andperformance is more pronounced for banks that are prone to emphasize status, suchas large banks and banks with high CEO power. Banks with high perks are alsoassociated with high risk-taking and are more likely to be engaged in events thathave a high variability of performance. Boards of directors in high-perk banks are less diversified, but surprisingly, more professional. Evidence also presents thatfewer directors with unaffiliated business experience, fewer female directors, andolder directors serve on the boards of high-perk banks. Large boards and directorswith a higher education or academic background, which are common in high-perkbanks, fail to efficiently monitor perks. Gender-diverse boards provide bettermonitoring. |