應用賽局理論探討信用擔保機制於供應鏈採購模式之研究

Applying Game Theory to Credit Guarantee Mechanism on Supply Chain Sourcing Model

中小企業在臺灣扮演著舉足輕重的角色，不但與大企業形成完整的供應鏈，也是就業機會的主要提供者，因此中小企業是經濟發展的基礎重心所在。中小企業成長時需要資金融通，然而卻因其資訊不透明、財會制度不健全等因素，且無力提供擔保品下，而無法取得銀行授信。本研究透過供應鏈中製造商與銀行間達成違約時債務分攤協議，提供上游中小企業供應商信用擔保，並確保銀行放款後的期望投資報酬，降低銀行的風險，提升銀行放款意願，進而達到供應鏈雙方與銀行三方皆贏的模式。本研究建構一領導者與追隨者的賽局模型，上游供應商為一資金缺乏之中小企業，並在供應鏈中為追隨者，下游製造商為領導者，建立一雙方極大化自身利潤之供應鏈採購模型，透過逆向歸納法（Backward Induction）獲得各狀況下雙方之最佳決策與利潤，並進行敏感度分析並提出結論，冀望能提供未來供應鏈運作面臨資金融通議題時的決策參考。

Small and medium enterprises (SME) have been a major force in Taiwan. They play the part as a bridge between larger enterprises. In short, SMEs are essential foundations for the economic development in Taiwan. However, due to unhealthy financial/accounting systems which result in the risk of loaning, SMEs are required to provide collateralization as a guarantee when applying for financial support. This study is aimed to discuss the credit guarantee mechanism. The manufacturer provides collateralization for upstream SMEs as well as the expected return after the loan is lent by the bank, in order to reduce the risk of loaning and to make loaning easer; thus, achieving a win-win situation for the supply chain. A leader-follower game is introduced in this paper, with the upstream suppliers as a follower, and the downstream manufacturer as the leader. Both sides of parties are seeking to maximize profit and build up their supply chain purchase model. Backward induction is applied to obtain the optimal decision and profit maximization; additionally, certain important factors in the sensitivity analysis are discussed. The results provide references and solutions to the loaning decision making process for all parties in supply chain financing.