公司治理對盈餘預測之影響

The Impact of Corporate Governance on Earnings Forecasts

本研究主要檢視公司治理與盈餘預測誤差之關聯，本研究採多元迴歸分析，以2005 年至2015 年所有台灣上市(櫃)公司為樣本，並將代理問題加以區分為權益代理問題與核心代理問題，探討公司股權結構，董事會特性對盈餘預測誤差之影響。實證結果如下：(1)管理者持股與盈餘預測誤差呈負向顯著關係，支持利益收斂假說。(2)控制權與現金流量請求權偏離程度愈大，盈餘預測誤差愈大。(3)盈餘預測誤差會隨董監持股比率、機構投資人持股比率及獨立董監事比率而減少，但會因董監事持股質押比率及董事長兼任總經理而增加。

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of corporate governance onearnings forecasts errors. The sample of the study consists of public companies inTaiwan for the period from 2005 to 2015. The main feature of this study is that wedivide agency problem into core agency problem and equity agency problem, and weexplore the relation between ownership structure, board characteristics and earningsforecasts errors. Overall, this paper expects to explain corporate governance can reduceagency problem and the efficient corporate governance can decrease earnings forecastserrors.The empirical results indicate as follows ： First, managerial ownership isnegatively related to earnings forecasts errors and hence supportsconvergence-of-interest hypothesis. Second, as controlling right deviates from cash flowright, earnings forecasts errors is getting worse, that is, core agency problems becomemore serious in the firm. Finally, the shares of board directors, the shares of institutionalinvestor and the proportion of independent directors have negative relationship withearnings forecasts errors, but the pledged share ratio of directors and chairman servedCEO have positive relationship with earnings forecasts errors.