從歐盟會員國憲政危機檢討 哥本哈根政治標準執行上之缺失

Member States' Constitutional Crises and Deficiencies in EU's Implementation of the Copenhagen Political Criteria

在歐盟與中東歐及巴爾幹國家的加盟談判過程中，哥本哈根標準審查機制促成了此些國家民主、法治、人權保障制度與經濟模式的歐洲化，惟近來部分中東歐國家爆發憲政危機，顯示現行審查機制事實上未能確保所有加盟國的憲政體制皆達到歐盟所要求的穩定性。藉由釐清歐盟價值秩序與會員國憲政秩序的交互影響關係、耙梳歐盟價值保障機制的沿革過程，以及分析匈、波兩國憲政危機之政經社因素，本文主張東擴過程中歐盟在時間壓力下對加盟談判操之過急，以及加盟談判未能強化加盟國之公民社會，是導致哥本哈根政治標準無法克竟其功的重要原因。

Accession negotiations have contributed significantly to the Europeanization of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and economic models in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans. However, recent constitutional crises in Central and Eastern European countries demonstrate that the Copenhagen Criteria have failed to ensure that all candidate states have reached the required degree of stability in their constitutional systems before accession. Why did the EU fail to screen out those applicants that as yet lacked sufficiently strong democratic institutions, despite the great efforts made during the screening process? By clarifying the interaction between the EU value order and the constitutional orders of the Member States, revisiting the evolution of the EU value-protecting mechanism, and analyzing the socio-political and economic factors behind the constitutional crises in Hungary and Poland, this paper argues that the overhasty pace of the accession negotiations, and the fact that the current value-protecting mechanism was unable to sufficiently empower civil society in the candidate states, are important reasons for the weakness of the current mechanism.