規則依循與科學知識的社會學

Rule-Following and Sociology of Scientific Knowledge

後期維根斯坦的哲學論述對主張科學知識具有社會性面向的理論進路提供重要的資源與依據，從孔恩援引家族相似性的論理來支撐其典範概念，到布洛爾與林區訴諸對規則依循的不同理解來發展其各自的科學知識社會學與俗民方法論，均是其中具代表性的嘗試。有鑑於規則依循在維氏的論述裡比家族相似性概念更具基礎性與系統性，本文將聚焦於布洛爾與林區的著名爭論，透過庫許的相關討論及引進類詞學語意進路，來重估維氏哲學對科學知識本質的探討所帶來的影響。

Philosophical considerations of the later Wittgenstein have provided important conceptual resources those who claim that scientific knowledge has a social dimension in nature. Kuhn’s appeal to the notion of family resemblance in the support of his idea of paradigm, Bloor’s and Lynch’s divergent interpretations of what rule-following involves are among some of the representatives taking this approach. In view of the fact that Wittgenstein’s discussions of rule-following are more basic and systematic than those of family resemblance, this paper will focus on the noted “Bloor-Lynch debate”. Aided by Kusch’s related discussions on this issue and by the considerations of a generic semantic analysis offered by Leslie and Cheng, this paper aims to re-evaluate the impacts brought about by the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy to the inquiry concerning the nature of scientific knowledge.